The "classical" paradigm for denotational semantics models data types as domains, i.e. structured sets of some kind, and programs as (suitable) functions between domains. The semantic universe in which the denotational modelling is carried out is thus a category with domains as objects, functions as morphisms, and composition of morphisms given by function composition. A sharp distinction is then drawn between denotational and operational semantics. Denotational semantics is often referred to as "mathematical semantics" because it exhibits a high degree of mathematical structure; this is in part achieved by the fact that denotational semantics abstracts away from the dynamics of computation-from time. By contrast, operational semantics is formulated in terms of the syntax of the language being modelled; it is highly intensional in character; and it is capable of expressing the dynamical aspects of computation.
A number of recent developments (and, with hindsight, some older ones) can be seen as contributing to this goal of Intensional Semantics. We will focus on the recent work on Game semantics, which has led to some striking advances in the Full Abstraction problem for PCF and other programming languages (Hyland and Ong 1995) (McCusker 1996a) (Ong 1996) . Our aim is to give a genuinely elementary first introduction; we therefore present a simplified version of game semantics, which nonetheless contains most of the essential concepts. The more complex game semantics in ) (Hyland and Ong 1995) can be seen as refinements of what we present. Some background in category theory, type theory and linear logic would be helpful in reading these notes; suitable references are (Crole 1994) , (Girard et al. 1989) , (Girard 1995 ) (which contain much more than we will actually need).
won't distinguish notationally between an element and the corresponding unit sequence. Thus as denotes the sequence with first element a and tail s.
If f : X −→ Y then f * : X * −→ Y * is the unique monoid homomorphism extending f . We write |s| for the length of a finite sequence, and s i for the ith element of s, 1 ≤ i ≤ |s|.
Given a set S of sequences, we write S even , S odd for the subsets of evenand odd-length sequences respectively.
We write X + Y for the disjoint union of sets X, Y . If Y ⊆ X and s ∈ X * , we write s ↾ Y for the sequence obtained by deleting all elements not in Y from s. In practice, we use this notation in the context where X = Y + Z, and by abuse of notation we take s ↾ Y ∈ Y * , i.e. we elide the use of injection functions.
We write s ⊑ t if s is a prefix of t, i.e. t = su for some u. Pref(S) is the set of prefixes of elements of S ⊆ X * . S is prefix-closed if S = Pref(S).
Game Semantics
We give a first introduction to game semantics. We will be concerned with 2-person games. Why the number 2? The key feature of games, by comparison with the many extant models of computation (labelled transition systems, event structures, etc. etc.) is that they provide an explicit representation of the environment, and hence model interaction in an intrinsic fashion. (By contrast, interaction is modelled in, say, labelled transition systems using some additional structure, typically a "synchronization algebra" on the labels.) One-person games would degenerate to transition systems; it seems that multi-party interaction can be adequately modeled by two-person games, in much the same way that functions with multiple arguments can be reduced to one-place functions and tupling. We will use such games to model interactions between a System and its Environment. One of the players in the game is taken to represent the System, and is referred to as Player or Proponent; the other represents the Environment and is referred to as Opponent. Note that the distinction between System and Environment and the corresponding designation as Player or Opponent depend on point of view:
If Tom, Tim and Tony converse in a room, then from Tom's point of view, he is the System, and Tim and Tony form the Environment; while from Tim's point of view, he is the System, and Tom and Tony form the Environment.
A single 'computation' or 'run' involving interaction between Player and Opponent will be represented by a sequence of moves, made alternately by Player and Opponent. We shall adopt the convention that Opponent always makes the first move. This avoids a number of technical problems which would otherwise arise, but limits what we can successfully model with games to the negative fragment of Intuitionistic Linear Logic. (This is the ⊗, ⊸, &, !, ∀ fragment).
A game specifies the set of possible runs (or 'plays'). It can be thought of as a tree
where hollow nodes • represent positions where Opponent is to move; solid nodes • positions where Player is to move; and the arcs issuing from a node are labelled with the moves which can be made in the position represented by that node. Formally, we define a game G to be a structure (M G , λ G , P G ), where
• M G is the set of moves of the game;
• λ G : M G −→ {P, O} is a labelling function designating each move as by Player or Opponent;
• P G ⊆ nepref M alt G , i.e. P G is a non-empty, prefix-closed subset of M alt G , the set of alternating sequences of moves in M G .
More formally, M alt
G is the set of all s ∈ M * G such that
Thus P G represents the game tree by the prefix-closed language of strings labelling paths from the root. Note that the tree can have infinite branches, corresponding to the fact that there can be infinite plays in the game. In terms of the representation by strings, this would mean that all the finite prefixes of some infinite sequence of moves would be valid plays. For example, the game
represents the tree
We are using games to represent the meaning of logical formulas or types. A game can be seen as specifying the possible interactions between a System and its Environment. In the traditional interpretation of types as structured sets of some kind, types are used to classify values. By contrast, games classify behaviours. Proofs or Programs will be modelled by strategies, i.e. rules specifying how the System should actually play.
Formally, we define a (deterministic) strategy σ on a game G to be a non-empty subset σ ⊆ P even G of the game tree, satisfying:
To understand this definition, think of The first two conditions on σ say that it is a sub-tree of P G of even-length paths. The third is a determinacy condition. This can be seen as generalizing the notion of graph of a relation, i.e. of a set of ordered pairs, which can be read as a set of stimulus-response instructions. The generalization is that ordinary relations describe a single stimulus-response event only (giving rules for what the response to any given stimulus may be), whereas strategies describe repeated interactions between the System and the Environment. We can regard sab ∈ σ as saying: 'when given the stimulus a in the context s, respond with b'. Note that, with this reading, the condition (s3) generalizes the usual single-valuedness condition for (the graphs of) partial functions. Thus a useful slogan is: "Strategies are (partial) functions extended in time." Example 1.1 Let B be the game ({ * , tt , ff }, { * → O, tt → P, ff → P }, {ǫ, * , * tt , * ff })
This game can be seen as representing the data type of booleans. The opening move * is a request by Opponent for the data, which can be answered by either tt or ff by Player. The strategies on B are as follows:
{ǫ} Pref{ * tt } Pref{ * ff }
The first of these is the undefined strategy ('⊥'), the second and third correspond to the boolean values tt and ff . Taken with the inclusion ordering, this "space of strategies" corresponds to the usual flat domain of booleans:
Constructions on games
We will now describe some fundamental constructions on games.
Tensor Product
Given games A, B, we describe the tensor product A ⊗ B.
We can think of A ⊗ B as allowing play to proceed in both the subgames A and B in an interleaved fashion. It is a form of 'disjoint (i.e. non-communicating or interacting) parallel composition'.
A first hint of the additional subtleties introduced by the explicit representation of both System and Environment is given by the following result. 
In other words, only Opponent can switch from one subgame to another; Player must always respond in the same subgame that Opponent just moved in.
To prove this, consider for each s ∈ P A⊗B the 'state'
We will write O for even parity, and P for odd parity, since e.g. after a play of even parity, it is Opponent's turn to move. Initially, the state is 
We see immediately from this that the switching condition holds; and also that the state (P, P ) can never be reached (i.e. for no s ∈ P A⊗B is s = (P, P )).
Linear Implication
Given games A, B, we define the game A ⊸ B as follows:
This definition is almost the same as that of A⊗B. The crucial difference is the inversion of the labelling function on the moves of A, corresponding to the idea that on the left of the arrow the rôles of Player and Opponent are interchanged.
If we think of 'function boxes', this is clear enough:
On the output side, the System is the producer and the Environment is the consumer; these rôles are reversed on the input side. Note that M alt A⊸B , and hence P A⊸B , are in general quite different to M alt A⊗B , P A⊗B respectively. In particular, the first move in P A⊸B must always be in B, since the first move must be by Opponent, and all opening moves in A are labelled P by λ A .
We obtain the following switching condition for A ⊸ B:
If two consecutive moves are in different components, the first was by Opponent and the second by Player; so only Player can switch components. This is supported by the following state-transition diagram:
The copy-cat strategy.
For any game A, we define a strategy on A ⊸ A. This will provide the identity morphisms in our category, and the interpretation of logical axioms A ⊢ A.
To illustrate this strategy, we undertake by the power of pure logic to beat a Grand-Master in chess. To do this, we play two games, one against, say, Kasparov, as White, and one against Short) as Black. The situation is as follows:
We begin with the game against Short. He plays his opening move, and we play his move in our game against Kasparov. After Kasparov responds, we play his move as our response to Short. In this way, we play the same game twice, but once as White and once as Black. Thus, whoever wins, we win one game. Otherwise put, we act as a buffer process, indirectly playing Kasparov off against Short.
This copy-cat process can be seen as a 'dynamic tautology', by contrast with classical propositional tautologies, which are vacuous static descriptions of states of affairs. The logical aspect of this process is a certain 'conservation of flow of information' (which ensures that we win one game).
Exercise 1.1 Suppose we had to play in two games against Short, both as Black, as well as one game against Kasparov as White.
Kasparov
Short Short
Would the same idea work? How about playing in two games against Kasparov, both as White?
Comment on the logical significance of these observations.
In general, a copy-cat strategy on A proceeds as follows:
(Here, we write A 1 , A 2 to index the two occurrences of A in A ⊸ A for ease of reference. Note also that we write s ↾ A 1 rather than s↾M A 1 . We will continue with both these notational "abuses").
We indicate such a strategy briefly by A
'& %$
⊸ A , alluding to axiom links in the proof nets of Linear Logic.
Example 1.3 Application (Modus Ponens).
This is the conjunction of two copy-cat strategies
Note that A and B each occur once positively and once negatively in this formula; we simply connect up the positive and negative occurrences by 'copy-cats'.
To understand this strategy as a protocol for function application, consider the following play:
ro -request for output ri -request for input id -input data od -output data
The request for output to the application function is copied to the output side of the function argument; the function argument's request for input is copied to the other argument; the input data provided at the second argument is copied back to the function argument; the output from the function argument is copied back to answer the original request. It is a protocol for linear function application since the state of both the function and the argument will change as we interact with them; we have no way of returning to the original state. Thus we "consume" our "resources" as we produce the output. In this way there is a natural match between game semantics and linear logic.
The Category of Games G
• Objects: Games
• Composition: interaction between strategies. This interaction can be described as "parallel composition plus hiding".
(Note that we extend our abuse of notation for restriction here; by s↾A, B we mean the restriction of s to M A + M B as a "subset" of M A + M B + M C , and similarly for s↾A, C and s↾B, C.) This definition looks very symmetric, but the actual possibilities are highly constrained by the switching condition.
Initially, Opponent must move in C (say with c 1 ). We consider τ 's response. If this is in C, then this is the response of σ; τ to c 1 . If τ responds in B, say with b 1 , then a move by Player in B in B ⊸ C is a move by Opponent in A ⊸ B. So it makes sense to consider σ's response to b 1 . If it is in A, this is the overall response of σ; τ to c 1 . If σ responds with b 2 in B, then b 2 is a move by Opponent in B ⊸ C, and we consider τ 's response. Continuing in this way, we obtain a uniquely determined sequence.
If the sequence ends in a visible action in A or C, this is the response by the strategy σ; τ to the initial move c 1 , with the internal dialogue between σ and τ in B being hidden from the Environment. Note that σ and τ may continue their internal dialogue in B forever. This is "infinite chattering" in CSP terminology, and "divergence by an infinite τ -computation" in CCS terminology.
As this discussion clearly shows composition in G is interaction between strategies. The following fact is useful in the analysis of composition.
The map s → s↾A, C induces a surjective map
Covering Lemma. ψ is injective (and hence bijective) so for each t ∈ σ; τ there is a unique s ∈ σ τ such that s ↾ A, C = t.
2 Prove the Covering lemma by formalizing the preceding discussion.
An alternative definition of Cut
We give a more direct, 'computational' definition.
σ; τ = {s; t | s ∈ σ ∧ t ∈ τ ∧ s↾B = t↾B}.
This defines
We can then define s; t = s t.
Exercise 1.3 Prove that the two definitions of σ; τ coincide.
Proposition 1.2 G is a category.
In particular, id A : A −→ A is the copy-cat strategy described previously. is the empty game, so that the above compositions make sense). Tensor structure of G
We will now see (in outline) that G is an "autonomous" = symmetric monoidal closed category, and hence a model for IMLL, Intuitionistic Multiplicative Linear Logic. We have already defined the tensor product A ⊗ B on objects. Now we extend it to morphisms:
This can be seen as disjoint (i.e. non-communicating) parallel composition of σ and τ .
Exercise 1.7 Check functoriality, i.e. the equations
• id A ⊗ id B = id A⊗B .
The tensor unit is defined by:
The canonical isomorphisms are conjunctions of copy-cat strategies.
assoc A,B,C :
The application (or evaluation) morphisms
have already been defined. For currying, given
Exercise 1.9 Prove that I is terminal in G, i.e. for each A there is a unique morphism t A : A −→ I.
This shows that G is really a model of Affine Logic, in which (unlike in Linear Logic proper) the Weakening rule is valid. Indeed, tensor has "projections": 
(Draw a picture of the game tree of A&B; it is formed by gluing together the trees for A and B at the root. There is no overlap because we take the disjoint union of the alphabets.) Prove that A&B is the product of A and B in G, i.e. define projections • sab, tac ∈ σ ⇒ b = c.
• sab, t ∈ σ, ta ∈ P A ⇒ tab ∈ σ.
Prove that id A , assoc A,B,C , sym A,B , Ap A,B , unitl A , unitr A , fst A,B , snd A,B are all history-free; and that if σ and τ are history free so are σ ; τ , σ ⊗ τ , and Λ(σ). Conclude that the sub-category G hf , of history-free strategies is also a model of IMLL. What about the pairing operation σ, τ ? Does G hf have binary products?
Winning Strategies
As we have seen, deterministic strategies can be viewed as partial functions extended in time. This partiality is appropriate when we aim to model programming languages with general recursion, in which the possibility of non-termination arises. However we would also like to use game semantics to model logical systems satisfying Cut Elimination or Strong Normalization. We would therefore like to find a condition on strategies generalizing totality of functions. The obvious candidate is to require that at each stage of play, a strategy σ on A has some response to every possible move by opponent.
(tot)
s ∈ σ, sa ∈ P A ⇒ ∃b : sab ∈ σ Call a strategy total if it satisfies this condition. However, totality as so defined does not suffice ; in particular, it is not closed under composition.
Exercise 2.1 Find games A, B, C and strategies σ : A → B and τ : B → C, such that
• σ and τ are total
• σ; τ is not total.
(Hint: use infinite chattering in B.)
The best analogy for understanding this fact is with the untyped λ-calculus: the class of strongly normalizing terms is not closed under application. Thus in the Tait/Girard method for proving strong normalization in various systems of typed λ-calculus, one introduces a stronger property which does ensure closure under application. The approach we will pursue with strategies can be seen as a semantic analogue of this idea.
The idea is to take winning strategies. Given a game A, define P ∞ A , the infinite plays over A, by
(By Pref(s) we mean the set of finite prefixes.) Thus the infinite plays correspond exactly to the infinite branches of the game tree. Now a set W ⊆ P ∞ A can be interpreted as designating those infinite plays which are "wins" for Player. We say that σ is a winning strategy with respect to W (notation: σ |= W ), if:
• σ is total
Thus σ is winning if at each finite stage when it is Player's turn to move it has a well defined response, and moreover every infinite play following σ is a win for Player.
We introduce an expanded of refined notion of game as a pair (A, W A ), where A is a game as before, and W A ⊆ P ∞ A is the designated set of winning infinite plays for Player. A winnining strategy for (A, W A ) is a strategy for A which is winning with respect to W A .
We now extend the definitions of ⊗ and ⊸ to act on the winning set specifications:
Exercise 2.2 Why did we not define
(Hint: consider the switching condition for ⊗).
In order to check that these definitions work well, we must show that the constructions on strategies we have introduced in order th model the proof rules of Linear Logic are well-defined with respect to winning strategies. Exercise 2.3 Show that, for any (A, W A ), the copy-cat strategy id A is a winning strategy. Now we consider the crucial case of the Cut rule.
Suppose then that σ : (A, W A ) ⊸ (B, W B ) and τ : (B, W B ) ⊸ (C, W C ). We want to prove that σ; τ is total, i.e. that there can be no infinite chattering in B. Suppose for a contradiction that there is an infinite play
with all moves after the finite prefix s in B. Then t ↾ A, B is an infinite play in A ⊸ B following σ, while t ↾ B, C is an infinite play in B ⊸ C following τ . Since σ is winning and t ↾ A is finite, we must have t ↾ B ∈ W B . But then since τ is winning we must have t ↾ C ∈ W C , which is impossible since t ↾ C is finite.
Exercise 2.4 Give a direct proof (not using proof by contradiction) that winning stratregies compose. 
Polymorphism
Our aim now is to use game semantics to give a model for polymorphism. We extend our notation for types with type variables X, Y, ... and with second order quantifiers ∀X.A
As a test case, we want our model to have the property that the interpretation it yields of the polymorphic (affine) booleans
has only two elements, corresponding to the denotations of the terms tt def ≡ ΛX.λx, y : X.x ff def ≡ ΛX.λx, y : X.y Firstly, we need some control over the size of the universe of types. To achieve this, we assume a non empty set V satisfying V + V ⊆ V (for example take V = {0, 1} * ). Now we define a game U by:
(Here KP is the constant function valued at P .) We can define a partial order on games by:
We define a variable type (in k variables) to be a function (monotone with respect to )
(that was the point of having V + V ⊆ V) Thus variable types will be closed under ⊗ and ⊸. Given F, G :
A uniform strategy σ on a variable type F is defined to be a strategy on F ( U ) such that, for all A ∈ G k U , σ A is a well-defined strategy on F ( A), where σ A is defined inductively by
Exercise 3.2 Show that the following properties hold for a uniform strategy σ on F :
where i∈I A i is the directed join of the A i (defined by component-wise union), and i∈I σ A i is the directed union of the strategies σ A i .
Our aim now is to show that, for each k ∈ ω, we obtain a category G(k) with: objects : variable types F :
The idea is that all the structure is transferred pointwise from G to G(k).
Exercise 3.3 Check that σ; τ is a well-defined uniform strategy on F ⊸ H.
etc. Now we define a "base category" B with the objects G k U , k ∈ ω, and -monotone functions as morphisms. For each object G k U of B, we have the autonomous category G(k). For each monotone
The above defines a (strict) indexed autonomous category.
At this point, we have enough structure to interpret types and terms with type variables. It remains to interpret the quantifiers. For notational simplicity, we shall focus on the case ∀X.A(X) where X is the only type variable free in A. Semantically A will be interpreted by a function F : G U → G U . We must define a game Π(F ) ∈ G U as the interpretation of ∀X.A Corresponding to the polymorphic type inference rule (∀ − elim) (Here KΠ(F ) : G U → G U is the constant function valued at Π(F ). Note that K = t * U where t : U → 1 = G 0 U is the map to the terminal object in B.) Corresponding to the type inference rule
we must prove the following universal property:
for every C ∈ G U and uniform strategy σ : KC → F there exists a unique strategy Λ 2 (σ) : C → Π(F ) such that
This says that there is an adjunction
Furthermore, we must show that the Beck-Chevalley condition holds (see (Crole 1994) ).
Remark 3.1 More generally, we should show the existence of adjunctions
where p : G k+1 U → G k U is the projection function. Now, how are we to construct the game Π(F )? Logically, Π is a secondorder quantifier. Player must undertake to defend F at any instance F (A), where A is specified by Opponent. If Opponent were to specify the entire instance A at the start of the game, this would in general require an infinite amount of information to be specified in a finite time, violating a basic continuity principle of computation ("Scott's axiom"). Instead we propose the metaphor of the "veil of ignorance" (cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice). That is, initially nothing is known about which instance we are playing in. Opponent progressively reveals the "game board" ; at each stage, Player is constrained to play within the instance thus far revealed by Opponent.
This intuition is captured by the following definition.
is defined inductively as follows:
The first clause in the definition of P Π(F ) is the basis of the induction. The second clause refers to positions in which it is Opponent's turn to move. It says that Opponent may play in any way which is valid in some instance (extending the current one). The final clause refers to positions in which it is Player's turn to move. It says that Player can only move in a fashion which is valid in every possible instance.
For the polymorphic projection
π A plays copy-cat between Π(F ) and F (A). This is uniform, witnessed by the "global copy-cat" id F (U ) . Why does this definition work? Consider the situation
At this stage, it is Opponent's turn to move, and of course there are many moves in Π(F ) which would not be valid in F (A). However, Opponent in Π(F ) in contravariant (i.e negative) position must play as Player in Π(F ), and hence is constrained to respond to a only in a fashion which is valid in every instance in which a can be played, and which in particular is valid in F (A). Hence Opponent's response can safely be copied back into F (A). Now for the universal property. Given uniform σ : KC → F , we define
That this is valid follows from the uniformity of σ so that at each stage its response must be valid in any instance that we might be in. It is then clear that
and hence that this definition fulfills the required properties.
Since we are interested in modeling IMLL2 (second order IMLL) we will refine our model with the notion of winning strategy, as explained in the previous section.
Firstly, we briefly indicate the additional structure required of a specification structure in order to get a model for IMLL2 in the refined category.
We assume that variable types are modeled by monotone functions F : G U → G U equipped with actions
Also there is an action:
Now in the case of the specification structure W for winning strategies, we define:
Exercise 3.4 Verify that this satisfies (∀-intro) and (∀-elim).
Thus we have a game semantics for IMLL2 in which terms denote winning strategies. How good is this semantics? As a basic test, let us look at the type ∀X. X ⊸ (X ⊸ X) which we write as
using indices to refer to the occurrences of X. What are the winning strategies for this type? Note that the first move must be in X 3 . Because of the definition of Π, Player can only respond by playing the same move in a negative occurrence of X, i.e X 1 or X 2 . Suppose Player responds in X 2 :
At this point, by the switching condition Opponent must respond in X 2 , say with a move b ; what can Player do next? If he were playing as the term ΛX.λx, y : X.y, then he should copy b back to X 3 . However there is another possiblity (pointed out by Sebastian Hunt): namely, Player can play a in X 1 , and continue thereafter by playing copy-cat between X 1 and X 3 . This certainly yields a winning strategy, but does not correspond to the denotation of any term.
To eliminate such undesirable possibilities, we introduce a constraint on strategies. Recall from Exercise 1.10 that a strategy is history-free if its response at any point depends only on the last move by Opponent: that is, if it satisfies:
sab ∈ σ, ta ∈ P A ⇒ tab ∈ σ.
The history-free strategies suffice to model the multiplicatives and polymorphism, so we get a model G hf W of IMLL2. Now consider again the situation
Player can only respond to b by copying b into X 3 if he is following a historyfree strategy: the option of playing a in X 1 is not open to him, because a is not "visible" to him. Thus he can only proceed by
Moreover, Player must continue to play copy-cat between X 2 and X 3 ever thereafter, since the information available to him at each stage is only the move just played by Opponent. Note also that Player must play in the same way, regardless of which move is initially made by Opponent. For example, suppose for a contradiction that Player responded to a 1 , by copying it to X 1 , and to a 2 by copying it to X 2 . Now consider the situation:
Since Player is following a history-free strategy, he must always respond to a 2 by copying it to X 2 ; but the above position is clearly not valid, since there is an instance A with P A = Pref {a 1 b 1 a 2 } in which a 2 cannot be played as an initial move.
Thus we conclude that for our test case the model G hf W does indeed have the required property that the only strategies for the game
are the denotations of the terms: ΛX.λx, y : X.x ΛX.λx, y : X.y copycat between X 1 and X 3 copycat between X 2 and X 3 .
Exercise 3.5 Show that the only two strategies in G hf W for the game
are those corresponding to the identity and the twist map.
Open problem For which class of (closed) types of IMLL2 do we get a "Full Completeness" result, i.e. that all strategies at that type in G hf W are definable in IMLL2?
Relational Parametricity
In this section, we investigate how the notion of relational parametricity can be adapted to the setting of games.
Firstly, we go back to the general level of Specification Structures. We use some notions due to Andy Pitts (1996) .
Given φ, ψ ∈ P A, we define:
This is always a preorder by (ss1) and (ss2). Say that the specification structure S is posetal if it is a partial order (i.e. antisymmetric). Now the notion of meet of properties i∈I φ i can be defined on P A. Say that S is meet-closed if it is posetal and each P A has all meets. Now we define a notion of relations on games. We shall focus on binary relations. Say that R is a relation from A to B (notation: R ⊆ A × B) if R is a non-empty subset R ⊆ P A × P B satisfying:
• R(s, t) ⇒ |s| = |t|.
• R(sa, tb) ⇒ R(s, t).
(So R is a length-preserving non-empty prefixed closed subset).
We shall define a specification structure R on the product category G ×G by taking P (A, B) to be the set of relations R ⊆ A × B. Given a relation R ⊆ A × B, we lift it to a relation R between strategies on A and strategies on B, by the following definition: R(σ, τ ) ⇐⇒ ∀s ∈ σ, t ∈ τ. R(sa, ta ′ )
This definition is "logical relations extended in time"; it relativizes the usual clause:
R(x, y) ⇒ [(f x↓ ⇔ gy↓) ∧ (f x↓, gy↓ ⇒ R(f x, gy))] to the context (previous history) s. It can also be seen as a form of bisimulation:
"If σ and τ reach related states at P 's turn to move, then one has a response iff the other does, and the states after the response are still related."
Exercise 4.1 Prove this! (The above "logical waterfall" diagram gives the idea of the proof.)
We shall in fact be more interested in "pulling back" this specification structure along the diagonal functor ∆ : G → G × G. That is, we are interested in the category G R with objects (A, R) where R ⊆ A × A and morphisms σ : (A, R) → (B, S) which are strategies σ : A → B such that R ⊸ S(σ, σ). We are also interested in the category G hf WR where we combine the winning strategy and relational structures, so that objects are (A, W A , R A ), where W A is a set of designated winning plays, and R A ⊆ A×A is a relation and σ : (A, W A , R A ) is a strategy σ : A → B such that W A {σ}W B ∧ R A {σ}R B .
Now we build a model of IMLL2 by refining our previous model with this specification structure R. A variable type will now be a monotone function
with an action F A : P A → P (F A).
We assume that the specification structure is monotone, in the sense that:
A B ⇒ P A ⊆ P B (this is easily seen to hold for R and W ), and that
We also require that if φ ∈ P A, ψ ∈ P A, A A ′ and B B ′ , then
We further assume that the specification structure is meet-closed. Then we define:
(This latter equality holds because of the above monotonicity properties).
The fact that (∀-intro) and (∀-elim) are satisfied then automatically holds because of the definition of Π F as a meet.
To apply this construction to R, we must show that it is meet-closed. Firstly, we characterise the partial order on properties in R.
Proposition 4.2
R ≤ S ⇔ R even (s, t) ∧ S(sa, tb) ⇒ R(sa, tb) ∧ S odd (s, t) ∧ R(sa, tb) ⇒ S(sa, tb).
We can read this as: at O-moves S ⊆ R and at P-moves R ⊆ S. Proposition 4.3 i∈I R i is defined inductively by:
i∈I R i = {(ε, ε)} ∪ {(sa, ta ′ ) | (s, t) ∈ ∧ i∈I R even i ∧ ∃i ∈ I.R i (sa, ta ′ )} ∪ {(sab, ta ′ b ′ ) | (sa, ta ′ ) ∈ ∧ i∈I R odd i ∧ ∀i ∈ I.R i (sa, ta ′ ) ⇒ R i (sab, ta ′ b ′ )}.
Note the similarity between this definition and that of P Π(F ) , which is in fact the unary case of the above, indexed over P ⊆ nepref P F (U ) .
